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COUNTERING THE 'NOTHING BUT' ARGUMENT! 
Celia Wolf-Devine 
My purpose in this article is to counter one type of argument often put for-
ward to debunk religious experience. Those making the argument announce 
that, whatever the believer may think, all that is really going on is some natur-
al process. I consider two versions of this argument: one made by those who 
claim that when the believer takes himself to be experiencing God, what is 
really happening is nothing but changes in his brain, and one made in the 
Freudian tradition. I conclude that Christians who believe themselves to have 
experienced God should not allow themselves to be intimidated. 
My purpose in this article is to counter one type of argument often put 
forward in order to debunk religious experience. Those making this argu-
ment most aggressively are dogmatic naturalists who offer alternative 
explanations of religious experience, and then announce that, regardless of 
what the believer may think, all that is really going on is nothing but electri-
cal and chemical changes in the brain, or regression to an infantile state (to 
mention only two examples). There are also, of course, people who are 
generally skeptical about religious experience and who think that it is 
impossible to decide between naturalistic and theistic explanations. And 
those of a Calvinist bent may have theologically based doubts about reli-
gious experience as a result of their deeply suspicious attitude toward the 
religion of the Jlnatural man." 
In this essay, I will discuss the naturalistically based doubts and not the 
theologically based ones, because the latter raise a whole different set of 
issues. I focus on Christian religious experience, and have written the 
paper as though it is addressed to an intelligent believer (sometimes 
addressed as Jlyou") who has had at least some experiences which he takes 
to be experiences of God, but who feels a bit shaken and at a loss about 
how to defend his conviction that he was, indeed, experiencing God 
against these types of doubts. Philosophers, in part under the influence of 
William James, have tended to concentrate on the dramatic, Damascus 
Road types of religious experiences, but that, I think, is misleading. 
Experiences of God are often quite subtle, and for that reason it is easy to 
begin to wonder afterwards whether what you experienced was really the 
presence of God, or whether there might be some other explanation for iU 
Naturalists who make the Jlnothing but" argument are not merely argu-
ing that on occasion you might take something to be an experience of a 
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spiritual being that in fact has a purely natural cause - for example, that 
your perception of demons surrounding your bed last night may have 
been the result of the LSD you consumed while watching The Exorcist, or 
that your vision of the Virgin Mary telling you that women who wear 
short skirts are all going to Hell may have been the product of your own 
overheated imagination, motivated, perhaps, by some sort of jealousy or 
sexual frustration. If that were all they were saying, what they say might 
be useful as a corrective for weeding out some fraudulent religious claims 
(believers are, after all, not committed to accepting every claim to religious 
experience). But they are saying more than this. They would never, in 
principle, permit a supernatural cause to play any role in explaining a 
putative religious experience because they believe that there is nothing 
transcending the physical world to act upon us. 
Such people thus rule the believer's own lived experience and under-
standing of that experience out of court at the start. But if you do not assume 
that there is no God to act upon us, and leave that question open, then what 
they say looks a lot less threatening. And to the extent that the science they 
rely on is sound, it remains to be established that it even threatens faith.3 
I will consider two versions of the "nothing but" argument - one put 
forward by those who claim that when the believer takes himself to be 
experiencing God, what is happening is really nothing but chemical and 
electrical changes in his brain, and the other articulated by those in the 
Freudian tradition. I will deal with the first type of reductionist explana-
tion quite briefly. 
Those naturalists who argue that all that is really going on is some sort 
of strange chemical or electrical changes in the brain have a way of making 
authoritative sounding claims about the relationship between the brain 
and the mind that leave the non-scientist feeling mystified and impressed. 
The notion of a "soul" seems positively medieval to them, and is never 
mentioned at all. They are materialists, and simply identify the mind with 
the brain and central nervous system. The doubts they raise can be coun-
tered in two ways. 
First, on their own account, all our mental states are equally the product 
of processes going on in the brain. If I see a tree in front of me, there is a 
complicated process going on in my nervous system and brain. If I have a 
hallucination, likewise, there is also a complicated process going on in my 
nervous system and brain. So if complicated electrical and chemical 
processes were occurring in my brain at the time when I was having an 
experience of God, that by itself would not invalidate my claim to be expe-
riencing God. Whether God in fact communicates with us by causing 
changes in our brains that, then, cause certain mental states in us, or 
whether He does so in some other way is not, I think, something that the 
believer needs to take a position on. How one explains perception (reli-
gious or ordinary) depends on one's background metaphysics, and so long 
as that metaphysics does not exclude God, then He is free to act on us in a 
variety of different ways that would produce the observed electrical and 
chemical changes in the brain. 
Second, people who claim to understand brain function and the way it 
impacts our conscious experience are largely engaged in bluffing. The 
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brain is poorly understood, and there seems to be a very loose fit between 
brain function and mental function. People who have lost important parts 
of their brain are often able to function surprisingly well because other 
parts of the brain take over functions originally done by the damaged part. 
And I recently read that there are people who were found in autopsies to 
have the brain deterioration characteristic of Alzheimer's but who had not 
had the symptoms of it during their lives. In light of all this, then, the sug-
gestion that "all that is going on is weird changes happening in your 
brain" should not intimidate you. 
The Freudian version of the "nothing but" argument requires more 
extensive discussion. Freudian psychology has permeated down to the 
grassroots level, and spawned a variety of inter-related doubts, both about 
the origin and nature of religious belief and about what is really going on in 
cases where people claim to have had experiential awareness of God. I will 
first say some general things about that psychology, and then address a few 
of the specific ways in which Freudians have attempted to discredit religion 
and religious experience. My purposes do not require a precise scholarly 
account of Freud's theory or that of his successors: versions of Freudian 
psychology that differ in other ways - for example, in regarding religion as 
healthy or pathological, or in providing different analyses of the psychology 
of women - converge on a reductionist view of religious experience. 
The Freudian version of the reductionist argument goes like this: 
Believers pray the Lord's prayer addressing God as "father," and some-
times believe that they are experiencing God's love or being in some spe-
cial way united with God. They believe that they stand under God's judg-
ment, and that God forbids certain actions and enjoins others. But all this 
can be easily explained in naturalistic terms. What is really going on is 
nothing but wishful thinking and projection of their infantile image of their 
father, regression to an infantile fantasy, or perhaps some sort of auto-erot-
ic narcissistic phenomenon. And what we take to be God correcting us 
morally is really nothing but our own superego which derives from our 
internalization of parental authority figures. 
I begin by treating Freud's objection as it pertains to religion in general, 
and then look at its application to particular types of religious experience. 
As in the case of the "nothing but something weird going on in your brain" 
objection, there is quite a bit of bluffing going on here. For one thing, since 
Freud assumed without proof that there is no God and then set out to try 
to find naturalistic explanations for religious belief and practice, there 
could be considerable truth to some of his naturalistic explanations with-
out this proving that there is no God. Just as God may choose to cause our 
experiences of Him by means of certain changes in our brains and nervous 
systems, He may also draw on some of the parental imagery from our 
memories and imaginations in revealing Himself in Scripture or religious 
experience. If you take away the unstated premise that there is no God, the 
Freudian arguments look a lot less convincing. All the same, they do retain 
a certain force. If a purely naturalistic explanation can be actually provided 
for all putative cases of religious experience, then why postulate a super-
natural cause? But can such an explanation be provided? In responding to 
the Freudian critique of religion, it is necessary to acknowledge what is 
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right about their views before going on to point out where they go wrong. 
One thing that they have right is the fact that human beings, like other 
species, have instincts - certain patterns that are "hard-wired" in our brains 
and bodies. For example, the sucking reflex. If this were not instinctually 
programmed into us, babies would not survive. The higher mammals gen-
erally have fewer hard-wired instincts (behaviors that do not need to be 
learned and that occur in exactly the same way each time), and more open-
ended instincts than lower animals. Thus, although females may have an 
instinctual desire to care for their infants, the ways in which they manifest 
this care are largely learned. For example, female apes that had not been 
raised by their mothers were found to have seriously deficient mothering 
skills when they became mothers. There are also some instinctual patterns 
that shape our reproductive behaviors, but there is controversy over just 
how many basic innate instincts there are and what they are. But whatever 
we perceive we perceive through the nature we have and this nature includes 
(even though it is not limited to) some deeply rooted instincts. 
The other thing they have right is that we are not entirely transparent to 
ourselves; our motivations are not always what we tell ourselves they are, 
and we can sometimes be confused about what comes from outside us and 
what arises from the depths of our own psyche. Freudians, thus, argue 
that something may seem to us to come from outside, and yet still be in fact 
something that is within our own psyche. Freud calls the id the "id" (a 
Latin word meaning "it") because the person (wrongly) experiences it as 
something other than himself, and the "superego" likewise can masquer-
ade as something external to the person. If this sort of thing can happen, 
then the fact we experience God as "other" than ourselves is not sufficient 
to establish that He is, in fact, a being other than ourselves. 
Neither of these concessions to the Freudians, however, need be fatal to 
the religious believer's confidence that there is a God and that we can 
sometimes experience His presence. Given that we are embodied beings, 
the way we perceive God's action on us and the language we use in trying 
to communicate it to others will be affected by our bodily nature. So, for 
example, if Brother Lawrence or St. John of the Cross or st. Theresa of 
A vila liken what they experience in prayer to the sort of delight the infant 
experiences at the mother's breast, this does not mean that all that is going 
on is that they are remembering their experience as infants or "regressing" 
to that infantile state. It means, rather, that they are praying in a deep way 
that involves surrender of their whole being to God, and not just their con-
scious minds. Given that the sucking reflex is one of our most deeply root-
ed instincts, the experience of being nourished and filled by God's love is, 
as it were, filtered through our instinctual nature which colors the way we 
experience God's love and provides an useful analogy for communicating 
our experience to others. 
At the risk of sounding a bit irreverent, I offer the following comparison. 
Sometimes when you pet a cat, stroking it all over, it will begin to purr and 
knead you with its forepaws, pushing with first one paw and then the 
other in a regular rhythm. If you know anything about cats, you will real-
ize that this is what kittens do when they are nursing; the motion with the 
paws makes the milk flow better and is, I believe, expressive of both its 
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desire for more milk and its pleasure in the taste of the milk it is enjoying. 
The cat, then, is perceiving your behavior toward it through the filter of its 
own hardwired instincts, and responding to you as it would to its mother. 
Obviously the gap between us and God is much larger than that between 
us and other animals, but the same general principle holds. Aquinas says 
that what is received is received according to the nature of the one receiv-
ing, and our instincts are one aspect of our nature. 
Likewise, even though there is more to us than our conscious minds and 
we are not wholly transparent to ourselves, it does not follow that every 
time we think we are experiencing God's presence or guidance that all we 
are experiencing is some part of ourselves (unless of course you assume, as 
Freud did, that there is no God to act on us). There may be ways of learn-
ing to tell real experiences of God from illusory ones. Furthermore, it is 
one thing to say that perhaps what appears external to us may in fact not 
be, and quite another to provide a plausible account of exactly how the 
mechanisms work, and why the naturalistic explanation is to be preferred 
to the religious explanation (either in general or in particular cases). 
Freudians tend at this point to do a lot of hand-waving and say vague 
things like "religious experience can be reduced without remainder to the 
working out of various infantile complexes," or that their theories have 
attained clinical success - whatever that means. 
The first two claims made by Freudians that I will examine are ones that 
attempt to discredit religion in general. Although professional philoso-
phers give them little attention, they are the sort of objection to religion 
that has a lot of currency at a popular level. 
Religious belief is just the result of wishful thinking. 
This argument is directed against the whole idea that there is a God at 
all, especially one who watches over us and loves us (Freud had Judaism 
and Christianity in mind here). It seems, Freudians suggest, a bit suspi-
cious that God is so often experienced as a loving Father. Isn't there some 
kind of wish fulfillment at work here? Perhaps we desire a God of this sort 
for purely psychological reasons, and delude ourselves into believing He is 
real. Freud thus argued that God was a kind of projection of the infant's 
image of the all-powerful, loving and protective Father. Life is too harsh 
and unbearable without the sense that one is watched over and protected 
by a father figure, so the believer projects a kind of great father in the sky 
and becomes persuaded that this is reality. 
First, we should beware of what is sometimes called the "let's not kid 
ourselves" fallacy. X is unpleasant and therefore it must be true. The fact 
that we long for God and hope to find that He is real and loves us does not 
by itself show that if we do sometimes experience a sense of His presence 
and love that therefore such experiences are illusory and simply conjured 
up because we want them. Certainly deception and self-deception are pos-
sible. But there is no reason to think all religious experiences result from 
them. Perhaps one might take our longing for God to be evidence that there 
is a God. It would be odd, would it not, if all the members of a species had 
a deeply rooted desire that could never be satisfied?4 Might we not argue 
that our desire for God is a kind of "mark of the maker" implanted in us by 
God to draw us to Him, as Descartes argues from the fact that we have an 
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idea of God (which he calls "the mark of the maker") to the existence of 
God as its cause. This mayor may not be an adequate proof of God's exis-
tence, but it does provide an alternative explanation of the facts. 
Second, it seems very implausible that our idea of God resembles the 
idea we had of our fathers as infants. And the problem is not just with the 
fallibility of our own fathers or with the fact that we live in a less patriar-
chal society than Freud. Arriving at an idea of an infinite being on the 
basis of experiences of finite beings is at least arguably impossible. 
Descartes tries to show this in his Third Meditation, and other arguments 
that carry less metaphysical baggage can be devised. At least Freudians 
owe us more in the way of an explanation than is usually provided. 
Finally, even if our idea of God did have strong affinities with the way 
we thought about our fathers when we were infants, this would not show 
that there is no God. Perhaps God, in revealing Himself to us as "father" 
in Scripture, is simply tapping into images we already have stored in our 
imaginations in order to communicate certain things about Himself,s as 
happens also when God is described as "king" or ''bridegroom,'' or likened 
to a nursing mother, or even to inanimate things - rocks, wind, fire. 
Religion is just a crutch. 
Pervading the way Freudians talk about religion is a rhetoric suggesting 
that religion is something for the weak - for those unable to face the harsh-
ness of reality as it is and needing comforting illusions to make it through 
the day (or perhaps the night). This rhetoric is one that many atheists 
employ, and it can be intimidating. We all naturally want to be treated 
with respect as adults, and therefore tend to shy away from things others 
regard as inappropriate to adults. So the way in which Freud traces reli-
gious belief to our infantile fears and desires can be unsettling. 
A little historical perspective is useful, for a start. Freud was the prod-
uct of a highly patriarchal, Victorian culture. Women were expected to be 
innocent, sweet, pure, pious and sheltered from the "real" world of fierce, 
cut-throat competition through which men earned money. Children were 
brought up in this sort of sheltered and pious atmosphere until they (the 
males among them) were ready to go out and be introduced by their 
fathers to the "real" world. But there is no reason to think either that 
women are less mature and strong than men, or that religion is only for the 
weak and immature. Maturity requires both women and men to fearlessly 
pursue the truth and embrace it when they find it. So unless you have 
already assumed (along with Freud), that there is no God and that there 
are no even halfway plausible reasons to suppose that there is, there is no 
reason to think that atheists are more fearless, truth-regarding, or mature 
than believers. For, if the pursuit of the truth leads to God, then there is 
nothing weak or immature about worshiping, loving, and serving that 
God. Christian beliefs, attitudes, and practices are altogether reasonable 
and appropriate if God is what they take Him to be. 
Imperfect as they are, parental analogies for thinking about God are also 
appropriate;6 He is, after all, the source of our being. And a kind of child-
like obedience, dependence, and trust in God is likewise the proper 
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response to a loving and omnipotent God Gesus, after all, says we must 
become like little children in order to enter the Kingdom of God.). 
Americans think of strength in terms of independence and believe there is 
something bad or weak about dependence on others. We are, however, 
excessive in our admiration of independence. The individual securely 
anchored into a community (upon whose help and support he can depend 
in times of need) is in a far stronger position than the isolated person, and 
the person who has learned to depend on God in all the vicissitudes and 
storms of life is the strongest of all. 
Having looked at some of the Freudian ways of debunking religion in 
general, we turn more specifically to religious experience and their attempts 
to provide purely naturalistic explanations of this. Freudian reductionist 
analyses of religious experience are likely to cut close to the bone for many 
believers because our relationship with God is, on one important level, an 
erotic one. There is a similarity between the religious impulse and the sexu-
al impulse; both are connected with a sense of one's own incompleteness 
and a longing for wholeness. Mystics often have recourse to sexual 
metaphors to describe the soul's union with God, and lovers often employ 
religious imagery in their poems. As Augustine said, "Thou hast made us 
for Thyself, and our hearts are restless until they find rest in thee." 
Eros has been understood in a variety of ways, depending on the meta-
physics of the individual. Freud and Augustine stand, as it were, at opposite 
poles here. For Augustine, all Eros is at bottom religious, for only in God 
can our desire be finally brought to rest. We mistakenly seek fulfillment in 
earthly goods, but in vain. Freud, being a materialist, regards all Eros as bio-
logically rooted7 and treats the more rarified manifestations of Eros like love 
of beauty or friendship as sublimations of basic instinctual drives. 
A particularly interesting illustration of the way in which one's under-
standing of Eros is tied to one's metaphysics is the case of Plato. Since he 
regarded things in the physical world as only imperfect copies of timeless 
and eternal exemplars, his understanding of Eros reflects this. He regard-
ed Eros as one basic longing in us for wholeness and fulfillment, expressed 
in many different ways, ranging from the crudest sort of sexual impulse to 
mystical yearning for the Good. The task of philosophy, for Plato, is to 
direct our erotic energies from their lower to their higher objects. The 
Good is eternal and therefore real, while fleshy satisfactions are transient 
and therefore unreal. Plato's teacher Socrates likewise used sexual 
metaphors in describing the student's progress toward attaining wisdom. 
He spoke of desire, conception and giving birth, and saw himself as a 
"midwife" helping his students give birth to the truth that they have con-
ceived in their souls through love of and desire for beauty. 
Eros, even on naturalistic assumptions, need not be only sexual. For 
example, our need for a strong protector, to which Freud appeals to 
explain religion generally, has an erotic element. But wherever it occurs, 
Eros has a way of making us vulnerable. Keeping our discussion of our 
faith squarely in the cognitive realm - on our beliefs and the rationality of 
those beliefs - is far less threatening than exploring the deep affective 
roots of faith. Acknowledging our brokenness, our hunger, our desperate 
need for God, exposes us in ways that open us up to being laughed at or 
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thought of as weak. But while Christian philosophers should certainly not 
abandon efforts to articulate the rational grounds of our faith, a balanced 
understanding of Christian faith must include both the cognitive and the 
affective, and perhaps Freudians do us a service in highlighting this ele-
ment in religious faith. The problem is not that they discover an erotic ele-
ment in faith, but that they massively misunderstand Eros. 
We turn now to some ways Freudians have tried to provide naturalistic 
explanations of certain types of religious experience. 
Putative experiences of union with God are merely regression to early infancy. 
Fundamental to the religious impulse is a desire to attain union with God 
- a union of love and knowledge. Freud, however, dismisses this as a kind 
of unhealthy regression. By the term "regression," Freudians mean that the 
one experiencing this reverts back to and re-experiences an earlier state of 
being - a more primitive and less developed one in which the boundaries 
between self and other are not yet sharply drawn. When the mystic claims to 
be experiencing unity with a transcendent being, Freudians argue that what 
is going on is in fact nothing but regression to an infantile fantasy of total 
union with his mother. The infant experiences his desire for his mother not 
just as a desire for nourishment, warmth and comfort, but also as a kind of 
longing to totally possess her - to be one with her. This fantasy can never be 
fulfilled according to Freud, as we can never be wholly one with another 
person, and by proper resolution of the Oedipus Complex, the child learns to 
renounce this longing. Since this particular fantasy of total union with the 
mother is closely tied to the death wish (a wish to be re-absorbed back into 
the being of the mother), it can be dangerous, and hence it is especially 
important to outgrow it, according to Freudians. 
There is an old hymn that says "Rivers to the ocean run, nor stay in all 
their course; fire ascending seeks the sun, both speed them to their source. 
So a soul that's born of God pants to view his glorious face; upwards tends 
to his abode to rest in his embrace. fls In a naturalistic framework, the 
desire to return to one's source can only be a desire to return to union with 
one's mother, since our flesh was taken from her.9 But if one believes, as 
Christians do, that our souls are created by God, then the picture is radical-
ly different. As argued above, the very desire for union with God can be 
understood as a kind of "mark of the maker." And God has ways of being 
intimate with us that no other human being ever could be. If God is the 
source of our life, then union with Him would be life and not death. 
Freudians and Christians, however, agree that total union with another is 
impossible, for it would mean a kind of death or dissolution of the individ-
ual. The Christian understanding of our union with God in the afterlife is 
one that preserves our individuality.lO We are not united with God like a 
drop of water that dissolves into the ocean. And even those Christian mys-
tics who claim to have experienced union with God, when they reflect about 
their experience, say that although phenomenologically their experience was 
one of union (their souls were so inebriated with God's love that they ceased 
to have any awareness of themselves as separate beings at all), the underly-
ing reality could not have been union in the sense of the two becoming one. 
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For God and human beings have radically different natures.ll 
Experiences of union with God are in any case fairly rare. Most of the 
average believer's religious experiences are not of this type, and so would 
not be vulnerable to Freud's criticism here. For example, believers may, in 
prayer, simply have the sense that they are not alone, or feel that God is 
showing them something about themselves, correcting them in some way, 
or giving them guidance about what they should do, and it is an important 
feature of such experiences that God is experienced as other. 
Mystics are just engaged in some sort of unhealthy self-worship (narcissism). 
If, in fact, the Freudians were right that there is no God (or other supernat-
ural beings that could act upon us), then it would follow that mystics must 
be discovering some previously unknown part of themselves when they 
take themselves to be experiencing God. They are thus simply self-
absorbed and engaged in a kind of unhealthy self-worship. There are, of 
course, religions that would accept and even celebrate this interpretation of 
what is going on in mystical experience. Some Eastern religions and New 
Age gurus hold that ultimately there is a kind of god-self in us that we 
should try to get in touch with - that at the deepest level we are divine, 
and need only come to realize this fact. So the idea that what we are get-
ting in touch with is a part of ourselves would not trouble them, although 
they would object to the accusation that discovering this inner self is in any 
way unhealthy. However this interpretation of mystical experience would 
not be acceptable to Christians. They believe that God is present every-
where (and consequently within us), but they also believe that He is tran-
scendent and that His divine life in us is His gift to us and not something 
we possess by our own nature or power. 
Accusations that the mystic is entangled in mere self-love, however, are 
premised on the belief that what the mystic is experiencing is in fact only 
himself or herself. So, unless you are an atheist, or perhaps a deist,12 it 
would seem reasonable to evaluate purported mystical experiences on a 
case by case basis. 
Brother Lawrence, interestingly, was charged by some of his contem-
poraries with "inactivity, delusion and self-love." His reply was to say: 
"Yet I cannot bear that this should be called delusion, because the soul 
which thus enjoys God desires herein nothing but Him. If this be delu-
sion in me, it belongs to God to remedy it. Let Him do what he pleases 
with me; I desire only Him and to be wholly devoted to Him."13 This 
reply would not, of course, persuade Freud, who would regard him as 
the victim of a delusion. But in a sense Brother Lawrence's reply contains 
the essential kernel of the appropriate Christian response to all such 
doubts. We must be passionate in our quest for the truth, beg God con-
stantly to protect us from being deceived by the figments of our own 
imaginations (or anything else), and trust that He will not allow the per-
son who is genuinely seeking Him to be permanently caught in delu-
sions. After all, He is seeking us as much as we are seeking Him. That is 
the point of the incarnation. 
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The Importance of the Christian Community 
Deception and self-deception are, of course, always possible, and apodeictic 
certainty is probably too high a goal to aim at. But Christians have ways of 
distinguishing veridical from illusory experiences of God. Scripture and the 
accumulated wisdom of Christians who have gone before us provide what 
Alston, in Perceiving God (Cornell, 1991), calls "overriders" that can help. 
Experiencing God directing you to forgive your father, for example, is "in 
character" for God in a way that telling you to kill yourself would not be. 
Being anchored in a tradition in this way is a corrective for certain types of 
delusional religious experiences. Philosophical reflection also has a role to 
play, as does private prayer - especially when we discern consistent pat-
terns over a period of time. A detailed examination of how to distinguish 
veridical from illusory experiences of God goes beyond the purposes of this 
essay.14 Suffice it to say here that Christians have considerable resources for 
making such discernments. It is not necessary to choose between complete 
skepticism and naive credulity. 
Actual Christians with whom you worship and share your faith can also 
help you make the appropriate discernments, although you need to keep 
the right balance between allowing yourself to be corrected by others and 
being faithful to your own experience. There is a part of us that belongs to 
God alone, and keeping this sort of private space is important for the 
growth of genuine intimacy. So be cautious about who you open up to, 
always praying before doing so. God may use others to steer us in the 
right way, and others may often be perceptive in their criticisms, but ask 
God to make the kernel of truth clear to you; don't just accept everyone's 
criticisms as true. There is a golden mean here. Don't be so thick skinned 
and smug that you are convinced you are always right. But don't take 
every criticism to heart either. A good prayer life will help you achieve the 
right balance. In the light of God's love you will be able to face the truth 
about yourself (gradually, of course). 
Religious longings are merely sublimated sexual desire. 
Some of those inspired by Freud interpret people's desire for God, or long-
ing to attain union with God, as simply sublimated sexual desire. Bernini's 
famous statue of St. Theresa pierced by the arrow of divine love depicts her 
in a position highly evocative of sexual arousal. Needless to say, Bernini 
was not present during st. Theresa's ecstatic experience, and is drawing on 
the vocabulary of earthly passion to convey something of the passionate 
quality of her experience. We, living in the wake of Freud and surrounded 
by a heavily sex-saturated culture, could easily be inclined to snicker and 
set it all down to her being a frustrated celibate; we know all about what 
that arrow symbolizes. Regardless of what Theresa herself may think, 
what is really going on is an intense sexual fantasy of some sort, culminat-
ing, perhaps in orgasm. Bernini's contemporaries would, I think, have 
been far less inclined to respond in this way because they did not draw a 
sharp dividing line between sacred and profane love in the way our puri-
tanical and prurient culture tends to do. Sexual ecstasy was viewed as 
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analogous to religious ecstasy so that either one could be viewed as a sym-
bol of the other. 
Freud has, in fact, come under attack lately from postmodernists who 
have questioned his tendency to stop interpretation when a sexual mean-
ing is discovered, arguing that anything can symbolize anything and that 
therefore there is no reason to take sexual meanings as basic. Might not 
sexual phenomena, themselves, symbolize non-sexual things? Impotence, 
for example, has frequently been used as a symbol of a broader loss of cre-
ative power - as in T.S. Eliot, Ernest Hemingway and Petronius. Or, from 
the female side, might not receptivity to penetration symbolize openness to 
receiving and nurturing new life, and fertility be symbolic of fruitfulness in 
a more general sense? 
Which meanings you take to be basic has a lot to do with your meta-
physics - your understanding of human nature and our place in the world. 
Underlying Freud's view is a metaphysical understanding of the person as 
essentially a biological organism like other animals, whose erotic longings 
are directed at purely physical satisfactions. But, as I have argued above, 
this is a very truncated and narrow understanding of Eros, and the meta-
physics underlying it is not uncontroversial. 
Finally, since Freud subjects all culture (and not just religion) to the 
same sort of reductionist analysis, he really has no good reason to heap 
such scorn upon religion, but not upon morality, science, and high culture 
generally. He believed that our basic personality structure has already 
been laid down well before we arrive at the age of reason. Our morality 
has its source in the way in which we internalized our parent of the same 
sex in the process of resolving our infantile Oedipal feelings (thus forming 
our "superego"). And this same superego is a crucial force in the forma-
tion of all human culture. Employing guilt as its weapon, it enables us to 
keep our instinctual desires under control, so we can sublimate them into 
"higher" things like art, science, law and so on. Even friendship is regard-
ed by Freud as a sublimation of our erotic feelings toward the friend. 
Although he does not subject science to the same sort of reductive analysis 
he employs elsewhere, he provides no good reason for not doing so. 
Might one not argue, for example, that attempts to purify our thought of 
irrational elements is a sublimation of primitive fear of excreta? Yet Freud 
regards morality and high culture as valuable even though they arise (on 
his view) from the transformation of infantile urges, and takes science to 
give us access to reality in a privileged sort of way. 
Concluding Thoughts 
The damned if you do, and damned if you don't problem. 
There is something disturbing about the way in which Freudian explana-
tions seem to be infinitely capable of being stretched to explain contrary 
phenomena. For example, Freud is wedded to the conviction that the 
Oedipus Complex is universal. If a man denies that he has ever felt any sex-
ual desire for his mother, Freudians will insist that he is merely in denial. 
The more strongly the man denies such feelings for his mother, the more 
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the Freudians take this to be evidence that denial is at work. Or the man 
who declares that, really, he has no strong feelings toward his mother of 
any sort will be immediately diagnosed as repressing his feelings. So what 
would count as evidence against the universality of the Oedipus Complex? 
And it seems a similar dialectic is at work in the case of religious experi-
ence. Freud was wedded to the conviction that a naturalistic explanation 
of all such phenomena could be provided. If you experience God as 
"other" then it must be your superego. If you experience yourself as unit-
ed with God it must be regression or some sort of auto-erotic narcissistic 
phenomenon. So what would count as evidence that an experience was 
veridical? Nothing. If you start with dogmatic naturalism, then naturalis-
tic explanations are all you are going to find. The important question has 
been begged. Really hard core naturalists will claim that, even if now 
some phenomena resist scientific explanation, eventually science will be 
able to explain them. These promissory notes on the future of science are 
worthless, however, since the future of science is unpredictable. 
People who live in glass houses should not throw stones. 
Naturalists often talk as though their view of the world was wonderful-
ly rational and consistent, and the religious view of the world, alone, was 
fraught with difficulties and inconsistencies. The truth, however, is that 
every world view has its weak points, or points at which it has to be 
stretched to fit reality. Reality is complex and multifaceted and beyond the 
power of the human mind to grasp completely. 
Materialism has its weak points. Reductive materialism has difficulty 
explaining consciousness. And materialism of any sort threatens to under-
mine itself. For if all our beliefs are equally just brain states caused by 
environmental and physiological factors, what grounds have we for saying 
some are true and others false? They are all, after all, simply responses of 
an organism to its environment, some of which may be adaptive and some 
of which may not be. Moreover, if eliminative materialism is true, there 
are no beliefs, so that neither a materialist nor anyone else believes materi-
alism (nor can anyone be brought to do so). 
Freudians are in something of a pickle as well. On the one hand, there is 
the Freud who discusses the psyche in very mechanistic terms, as though it 
were a kind of complicated hydraulic system. And on the other hand there 
is the wildly speculative Freud, who sought to understand the origin of 
culture (including religion) by opening the throttle on the mythic imagina-
tion and hypothesizing all sorts of things like the Primal Ape Horde, the 
slaying of the Primal Father by the band of brothers who then ate his flesh 
and had sex with all the females in the group, thus giving rise to guilt feel-
ings which inhibit the direct expression of instinct and thus require subli-
mation in the form of religion and high culture. (Moreover, these feelings 
must be somehow expunged if life is to go on.) The problem, however, is 
that these two Freuds do not fit together, and indeed seem to inhabit differ-
ent conceptual universes.IS Freud #1 is, or at least takes himself to be, a 
hard-nosed scientist. Freud #2 is essentially the founder of a new religion 
in which the Primal Ape Horde story replaces Genesis. 
Even the systems of thought devised by the great philosophers of the 
past have their rough spots. Plato's theory of forms ran into problems with 
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the famous "third man" argument; Aquinas had problems explaining the 
nature and powers of the separated soul; Descartes' dualism was notorious 
for its difficulties in explaining mind-body interaction, and so on. So if you 
have to struggle to fit things together, you are not alone. This is the task of 
a lifetime, no matter what basic conceptual framework you choose. It is 
true that to be an intellectually serious Christian requires some swimming 
against the stream culturally, so you have to work at articulating and 
defending your beliefs at those points where they are under attack by peo-
ple around you, and seek some support from other Christians at times. But 
this is merely a contingent cultural fact. If you were an atheist in Europe in 
the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries you would likewise have needed to 
seek fellow freethinkers to support you in your dissent from the way peo-
ple around you thought. Being countercultural does not show that 
Christianity is wrong (nor, of course, does it show it is right). But don't be 
intimidated into thinking that the sceptics' views are perfectly consistent 
and rational and explain everything because they aren't and they don't 
Stonehill College 
NOTES 
1. I wish to express my thanks to my husband Phil Devine for helping me talk 
out some of the ideas in this paper, making some helpful suggestions and com-
menting on two drafts of it. 
2. The same is true, I suppose of more dramatic experiences as well, although 
distinctions could perhaps be drawn among these. Conversion experiences charac-
teristically impart a firm conviction of their veridicality. Strange and bizarre expe-
riences might be doubted, not only on naturalistic grounds, but on the grounds that 
they could be demonic counterfeits. And so on. An interesting book on contempo-
rary religious experiences of a dramatic sort is Phillip H. Wiebe's book Visions of 
Jesus (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1997). 
3. Perhaps evolutionary biology might pose a more serious challenge to faith, 
but I do not discuss this here. 
4. This arguments is modeled on one that Aquinas gives for the immortality 
of the soul. 
5. This, of course, may make it harder for those who had harsh, rejecting, or 
otherwise abusive fathers to relate to God. 
6. We can think of God both as a father who is the cause of our being and 
watches over, guides, and protects us, or as a mother who nourishes, comforts, and 
sustains us. Paternal images arguably have a certain primacy for Christians for 
scriptural reasons, but any number of different images of God are present in 
Scripture as well and may be helpful in prayer. For an extended discussion of the 
issue of whether we should address God as "Father" see Unit VI of Sex and Gender: 
A Spectrum of Views edited by myself and Philip E. Devine (Wadsworth 2003). 
7. Freud says that "the forces which drive the mental apparatus into activity 
are produced in the bodily organs as an expression of the major somatic needs." 
"The Question of Lay Analysis: Conversations with an Impartial Person,"in The 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. James Strachey, ed., London: The 
Hogarth Press, 1975. Volume XX, p. 200. ) 
8. The hymn is entitled "Amsterdam," and can be found in The Sacred Harp 
1991 revision. The Sacred Harp Publishing Company. (For more information on 
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this see www.fasola.org.) 
9. Thinking literally, here, the nutrients that go to build up the infant's flesh 
are taken from her blood. This, of course, does not imply that the infant is part of 
the mother - only that he or she takes his or her physical substance from her. 
10. Christian philosophers have wrestled with the problem of how to under-
stand this for centuries. I offer some reflections on it in my manuscript The Heart 
Transformed: Prayer of Desire in the last section entitled "The Hope to Which We are 
Called." 
11. See, Mystic Union: An Essay in the Phenomenology of Mysticism, by Nelson 
Pike (Oxford; 1992) for a fascinating discussion of the way various saints and mys-
tics have described their experiences of union with God. 
12. Again, I am omitting those whose worries about religious experience are 
grounded in Calvinist theology. 
13. Brother Lawrence, The Practice of the Presence of God, (Springfield, IL: 
Templegate Publishers, 1974), pp. 77-78. 
14. I discuss the problem in some detail and supply a few guidelines in The 
Heart Transformed: Prayer of Desire [see footnote 9] 
15. lowe this point in part to discussions with Josef Velazquez. 
